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SLAYING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BEAST:
VIRGINIA'S FLAWED MULTI-FACTOR
APPROACH TO DIFFERENTIATING
"ORDINARY BUILDING MATERIALS" FROM
"EQUIPMENT"AND "MACHINERY' UNDER
CODE § 8.01-250
MEREDITH RENEGAR*

Virginia Code section 8.01-250 voids all claims against design professionals,
contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers arisingout of defective improvements
to real property when not brought within five years of the incorporationof that
improvement. However, manufacturersand suppliers of ill-defined "equipment"
and "machinery" are exempted from the statute's protection. Given the relatively
short statute of reposefor improvements to real property in the Virginia Code, the
threshold question of whether something is "equipment" or "machinery" has been
a centralissue in many tort cases before the Virginia courts.
Through a line of cases originating with the Supreme Court of Virginia's
1985 decision in Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum Co.,
Virginia courts have assembled a multi-factor test to distinguish the term of art,
"ordinary building materials," from "equipment" or "machinery." This
Comment argues that this sprawling and continuously growing factor-based
approach, in which no one factor is controlling, is overly cumbersome and
nebulous. It leads to inconsistent applications and results that offend modern
ideals of advancement and technology.
* Senior Symposium Editor, American University Law Review, Volume 63; J.D.
Candidate May 2014, American University Washington College of Law, B.A. Philosophy
May 2011, University of Virginia. My deepest gratitude to the entire staff and editorial
board of the American University Law Review, whose dedicated efforts and insightful
criticisms have made this Comment worthy of our masthead. A special thanks to my
friends, especially Meghan Quinn, for serving as my sounding-board and my first line
of defense against insanity throughout this process. Lastly, to my loving parents and
brother, thank you for your unwavering encouragement and for always championing
the examined life.
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To combat such an unworkable approach, this Comment proposes a two-fold
alteration--called the "classified common-sense approach"-to replace the
current jurisprudence. Within this approach, the Virginia legislature would
first supplement section 8.01-250 with an amendment or guiding document
that classifies real property into broad groups, i.e., manufacturing structures,
warehousefacilities, singlefamily dwellings, high-rise domiciles, etc. Second, the
proposed approach requires that within the legislatively-establishedclassification
system of improvements to real property, the courts would apply common-sense
notions of "ordinary building materials" and "equipment" rather than the
current multi-factor analysis. This construction of Virginia's statute of repose
offers more guidance and a simpler application than the current test, and
recognizes increasingtechnicaladvances in building technology.
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"In extraordinary times, the ordinary takes on a glow and wonder all
of its own. ,
INTRODUCTION

Construction spending in the United States totaled $816 billion in
2010.2 Of that figure, public construction spending accounted for

approximately $307 billion, private nonresidential spending for
approximately $267 billion, and private residential spending for
approximately $242 billion.3 In 2012, the Commonwealth of Virginia
issued 26,700 building permits for both single and multi-family
dwellings.4 As of March 2013, the number of building permits issued
in Virginia was four percent higher than the number issued by that
same time in 2012.' These statistics demonstrate that despite the
recent economic downturn, 6 there remains plenty of traffic, 7 and thus
plenty of potential liability, within the marketplace for improvements
to real property.8
The statute of repose delineated in Virginia Code section 8.01-250
nullifies all claims against design professionals, contractors,
1.

MIKE A. LANCASTER, HUMAN.4, at 22 (2011).

2.

Assoc. GEN. CONTRACTORS OF AM., THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CONSTRUCTION 1N
THE UNITED STATES (2011), available at http://www.agc.org/galleries/econ/National%20
Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Building Permits: States and Metro Areas, NAT'L ASS'N HOME BUILDERS (May
31, 2013), http://www.nahb.org/reference-list.aspx?sectionlD=132
(select the
"Building Permits: States and Metro Areas" hyperlink to download the Microsoft
Excel data spreadsheet).
5. Id.
6. See The Crisis in the ConstructionIndustry, WORLD WORK MAG. (Int'l Labour Org.,
Geneva, Switz.), Aug. 2009, at 16, 16-17 availableat http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/-dgreports/-dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_113838.pdf (explaining
that problems within the subprime housing market helped to initiate the widespread
financial crisis beginning in 2007 and 2008, making the construction industry an
early victim of the downturn).
7. See Kevin Carmichael, Housing Puts U.S. Economy on Firmer Footing, GLOBE &
MAIL
(Sept. 19, 2012, 7:30 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-onbusiness/economy/economy-lab/housing-puts-us-economy-on-firmer-footing/article
4553423 (charting homebuilder confidence at a six-year high); Amy Guthrie, Cemex
Says U.S. Sales Improving,WALL ST.J. (July 20, 2012 1:07 PM), http://online.wsj.com
/article/SB10000872396390444464304577538980567324836.html
(tracing the sales
of the world's third-largest cement company and noting that the increase in volume
sales to the United States evidences a heightened demand in American construction
markets, including the residential housing sector); see also id. (correlating an
improved housing market with construction rates growing at double-digit rates).
8. In Virginia, an improvement to real property may stem from any effort or
money expended pursuant to the betterment of the property or the immediate
benefit of the dweller or possessor. See Cullop v. Leonard, 33 S.E. 611, 612 (Va.
1899). Broadly, any structural extension or augmentation to a building that could
reasonably supplement its functional value is an improvement. Wiggins v. Proctor &
Schwartz, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 350, 352 (E.D. Va. 1971), superseded by statute, VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-250 (2009).
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subcontractors, and suppliers arising out of defective or unsafe
improvements to real property if the claim is not brought within five
years of the incorporation of that improvement.9 This exception,
added in 1973 to counteract what the Virginia General Assembly saw
as an undesirable result of Wiggins v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.,"°
eliminates manufacturers or suppliers of "equipment" and
"machinery" from the statute's protection."l Although the amended
statute explicitly excludes "equipment" and "machinery" from its
protection, it fails to specify what qualifies as "equipment" or
"machinery."12 The applicability of the statute of repose is thus
contingent upon what is included in the categories of "equipment"
and "machinery." Subsequent judicial discussion of this provision and
exception has thus been largely definitional. 3
Through a series of cases beginning with the Supreme Court of
Virginia's 1985 decision in Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. National Gypsum
Co., 4 the Virginia courts have constructed an ever-growing list of
various characteristics that ostensibly help to separate "ordinary
building materials" from "equipment" and "machinery."' 5 Within the

9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250; see alsoJOHN H. CRADDOCK, JR. & NICOLE HARDIN
BRAKSTAD, COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA CONSTRUCTION LAw COMPENDIUM 9 (2012),
available
at
http://www.uslaw.org/files/Compendinms20l2/Construction/Virginia Constructio
n_Compendium_12.pdf (observing that the statute of repose provides a termination
date for construction liability regardless of the cause of action involved). In total,
forty-five states have enacted statutes comparable to Virginia Code section 8.01-250.
Gerald W. Heller, The District of Columbia'sArchitects' and Builders' Statute of Repose: Its
Application and Need for Amendment, 34 CATH. U. L. REv. 919, 920 n.4 (1985); see, e.g.,
ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-56-112 (2005); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 337.1, 337.15 (West 2006); HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 657-8 (LexisNexis 2012);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.135 (West 2006); MINN. STAT. § 541.051 (West 2010);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-208 (2011); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-223 (2008).
10. 330 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. Va. 1971), superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01250; see also infra Part I.B (chronicling the Wiggins court's broad interpretation of
Code section 8-24.2 and the General Assembly's efforts to narrow the applicability of
the statute).
11. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24.2 (1964) (containing no mention of
"equipment" or "machinery"), with id. § 8.01-250 (2009) (stating that the limitation
of the statute is not applicable to those individuals who manufacture or supply
"equipment" or "machinery" that has been incorporated into or affixed to a structure
upon real property).
12. See id. § 8.01-250 (2009) (failing to include either an explicit definition
section or a more organic definition of the relevant terms).
13. SeeJamerson v. Coleman-Adams Constr., Inc., 699 S.E.2d 197, 199 (Va. 2010)
(remarking that cases subsequent to the 1973 amendment have concentrated on
whether the items and products at issue were "equipment or machinery" or "ordinary
building materials").
14. 331 S.E.2d 476 (Va. 1985).
15. See infra Part I.D (describing the evolution of the case law and the various
factors that the courts consider in their analyses).
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current framework, 16 no factor or group of factors is controlling;
rather, the specific facts of each case drive the analysis.' 7
This Comment argues that the current factors-based approach to
distinguishing "ordinary building materials" from "equipment" and
"machinery" for purposes of Virginia Code section 8.01-250 is overly
complex and burdensome. As a result of the test's increasing length
and involvedness, courts selectively employ various factors,
circumstantial evidence becomes increasingly dispositive, and the test
produces outcomes that are sometimes inconsistent with both
modern ideals and each other. 8 Remedying this effect will likely
require both legislative and judicial action.
To simplify the test and yield more consistent results that do not
offend modern notions of advancement and technology, this
Comment proposes a two-part alteration to the current "ordinary
building materials" jurisprudence.
First, the legislature should
consider supplementing Code section 8.01-250 with an amendment
or guiding document under which real property is classified into
broad groups, i.e., manufacturing structures, warehouse facilities,
single family homes, high-rise domiciles, etc. Second, the current sixfactor judicial test should be simplified such that, within the
legislatively-established classification system of improvements to real
property, common-sense notions of "ordinary building materials" and
"equipment" dictate the designation of items.
This "classified
common-sense approach" would ensure not only a less cumbersome
application, but also that results remain cogent with the underlying
nature of the structure as well as consistent with advancements in
technology.
Part I of this Comment provides a brief overview of the original
statute prior to its 1973 revision and chronicles the impetus for and
development of the "equipment or machinery" exception. This Part
then tracks the creation of the term of art, "ordinary building
materials," as first articulated in Cape Henry Towers and details the
jurisprudence that has developed as a result of the courts' attempts to

16. The current test applies six different factors and examines both the nature of
the product itself and the actions of the manufacturer in the production,
distribution, and installation of the product. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying
text.
17. Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 199 ("[Courts] have not held any single characteristic
or set of characteristics as determinative of the issue. Each case has been and must
be decided based on its own circumstances.").
18. See infra Part II (asserting that the current test is overly cumbersome,
comprises conflicting judicial standards, and produces results inconsistent with
evolving conceptions of what is ordinary).
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distinguish "ordinary building materials" from "equipment" and
"machinery."
Part II compares and contrasts how courts have applied this test
throughout history, analyzes the consistency of the results, and then
surveys the test's inconsistencies with modern notions of
Part III considers Justice Mims'
technological advancement.
proposed "common-sense approach" as articulated in his
concurrence in Jamerson v. Coleman-Adams Construction, Inc. 9 This
Part also suggests that the common-sense approach accounts for
neither the effect of technological advancements on modern notions
of what is essential to a structure, nor the underlying nature and
purpose of a structure. Finally, this Part proposes a new test-the
"classified common-sense approach"-and considers the potential
benefits and drawbacks of such an approach.
In closing, this Comment recommends that due to the
complications of the current test, the phrase "ordinary building
materials" has become a problematic term of art. Instead of
continuously augmenting the test with additional factors and
variables, this Comment concludes that the combination of an
amended statute and a simpler judicial test would allow for easier
application, more consistent results, and lower litigation rates.
I.
A.

BACKGROUND

DistinctionBetween Statutes of Repose and Limitation

Virginia Code section 8.01-250 contains a statute of repose for
improvements to real property. 2 Although closely related, statutes of
repose differ from statutes of limitation in that they create a
substantive right to be free from liability after the passage of a certain
period of time.2' Statutes of limitation, on the other hand, generate
only a procedural bar to a remedy.22 Furthermore, contrary to

19. 699 S.E.2d 197, 201 (Va. 2010) (Mims, J., concurring).
20.

VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250; seeJordan v. Sandwell, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 406,

412 (W.D. Va. 2002) (referring to Virginia Code section 8.01-250 as a "statute of
repose").
21. Shadburne-Vinton v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 60 F.3d 1071, 1075 (4th
Cir. 1995) (explaining that within a statute of repose, the timeframe for bringing a
claim is effectively transformed into a substantive element of the plaintiffs cause of
action); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 7 (2013) (clarifying that statutes of repose

imbue parties with a substantive right to be unencumbered by the threat of any
potential liabilities subsequent to a legislatively-determined date).
22. Shadburne-Vinton, 60 F.3d at 1075 (identifying statutes of limitations as tools of
public policy and court management, which do not imbue defendants with any right

to be immune from liability, although this may be their practical effect); 63B AM.JUR.
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statutes of limitations, statutes of repose begin to run from the
incidence of a legislatively-determined event, regardless of the
accrual of any cause of action.2 3
Generally, statutes of repose reflect an underlying legislative policy
judgment that actors should not face an everlasting threat of civil
liability for their previous acts or omissions. 24 Therefore, the time
limits associated with various statutes of repose fluctuate, as each
legislature must determine an acceptable period of protracted
liability. 2 The oft-criticized effect of statutes of repose is that some
plaintiffs' claims dissolve prior to their discovery or before they come
into fruition. 2' Nevertheless, legislatures effectuate statutes of repose
because they foster the goals of finality and certainty in legal
dealings. 7
Section 8.01-250 is a construction statute of repose that shields
contractors, architects, and project engineers from stale claims by
extinguishing protracted liability for workmanship. 28 It alters the
substantive rights and obligations of the parties to any litigation
emerging from an unsafe condition of an improvement to real
property more than five years after the incorporation of that
improvement. 29
This five-year period represents not only the
2D Products Liability § 1490 (2013) (detailing statutes of limitations as affirmative
defenses that extinguish the remedy but not the fundamental right).
23. 54 CJ.S. Limitations of Actions § 7 (comparing the conditional bar on a cause
of action not brought within a specified time period in a statute of limitations with
the absolute bar arising after a specified time period in a statute of repose).
24. Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 392 S.E.2d 817, 819-20 (Va. 1990) (reasoning
that a construction project can last for years after its completion and that a
defendant should not be subject to potential liability when evidence may have since
been lost or witnesses' memories faded); see Commonwealth v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 385 S.E.2d 865, 867 (Va. 1989) (commenting that statutes of repose
are one of three genres of statutory enactments that are intended to bar stale
claims); Sch. Bd. of Norfolk v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 360 S.E.2d 325, 328 (Va. 1987)
(adding that the expiration of the statutory period and subsequent termination of
the fights of plaintiffs is intended to protect defendants from liability for torts listed
in the statute).
25. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-241 (2010) (six-year statute of repose for
actions arising out of improvements to real property); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.097
(West 2002) (ten years); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (five years).
26. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at
168 (5th ed. 1984) (noting that while some statutes of repose have been invalidated,
most jurisdictions have upheld the constitutionality of repose legislation).
27. See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Terminating
Right of Action for Product-Caused Injury at Fixed Period After Manufacture, Sale, or
Delivery of Product, 30 A.L.R.5th 1 (1995) (listing cases that found statutes of repose
rationally related to a permissible state objective, such as protecting liability
insurance companies from an increasing number of product liability claims).
28. See DAVID M. HOLLIDAY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILrTY § 47:94 (3d ed.
2013) (purporting that a statute of repose truncates liability at the point at which a
party would be unfairly prejudiced in defending against charges of deficiency).
29. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250; Sch. Bd. of Norfolk, 325 S.E.2d at 328 (declaring that
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legislature's endorsement of ideals of finality and certainty,"° but also
the judgment that requiring a defense against charges of defective
design or construction after five years is unfairly prejudicial. 3'
B.

The OriginalVirginia Statute of Repose and the Development of the
Exception

The Virginia General Assembly codified the original version of
Virginia's statute of repose for improvements to real property in 1964
within Virginia Code section 8-24.2.32 The original statute contained
only the first full paragraph of the current statute and stated:
No action... arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of
an improvement to real property... shall be brought against any
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, surveying,
supervision of construction or construction of such improvement
to real property more than five years after the performance or
furnishing of such services and construction.33
In 1971, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
first interpreted section 8-24.2. In Wiggins, the plaintiff was allegedly
injured by a two-ton jute-picking machine that had been installed in a
factory fourteen years earlier. 4 Noting that the machine was an
"essential component of ... [the] manufacturing process" and was
"affix[ed] ...to a heavy concrete foundation... by means of heavy
hold-down bolts,"1 5 the court held that the machine was an

the substantive rights bestowed by Virginia's statue of repose may not be impaired by
retroactive application of the statute).
30. See Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 94 S.E.2d 537, 540 (Va. 1956) ("It is
elementary that an act creating a statutory offense, to be valid, must specify with
reasonable certainty and definiteness the conduct which is commanded or
prohibited, that is, what must be done or avoided, so that a person of ordinary
intelligence may know what is thereby required of him."). See generally 82 C.J.S.
Statutes § 86 (2013) (advancing that "[ciertainty is one of the prime requisites of a
statute"); supranote 27 and accompanying text (noting that legislatures favor finality
in legal relationships).
31. HOLLIDAY, supra note 28, § 47:94 (recognizing the application of repose
provisions to defend against actions for contribution and indemnity as well as in
actions for latent or patent deficiencies).
32. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24.2 (1964) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01250 (2009)).
33. Id.
34. Wiggins v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 350, 351 (E.D. Va. 1971),
superseded by statute, VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250; see Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. Nat'l
Gypsum Co., 331 S.E.2d 476, 479 (Va. 1985) (observing that while the Supreme
Court of Virginia had not yet been called on to consider the impact of section 8-24.2,
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia had done so in 1971 in
Wiggins).
35. Wiggins, 330 F. Supp. at 351.
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improvement to real property, and the party constructing it was thus
entitled to the protection of the five-year restriction. 36
Following the Wiggins decision, dispute erupted within the Virginia
legislature as lawmakers realized courts could construe the statute in
a manner that was considerably broader than originally intended. 7
As a result, the General Assembly re-codified former title 8 to the
current title 8.01 and added a second paragraph to the provision
which notes, "The limitation prescribed in this section shall not apply
to the manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or machinery or
other articles installed in a structure upon real property. ... "38

While the provision's amended version clearly and explicitly
excluded manufacturers and suppliers of "equipment" and
"machinery" from the statute's protection, 9 the question remained as
to what would fall into the categories of "equipment" or
"machinery. "
C. The Creation of the Term of Art: "OrdinaryBuilding Materials"
By explicitly establishing the class of "equipment or machinery,"
Virginia Code section 8.01-250 implies the existence of a correlative
class:
those improvements not qualifying as "equipment" or
"machinery."4 1
Virginia legislators, however, did not coin any
particular designation or term for those improvements not qualifying
as "equipment" or "machinery. 4 2 Instead, the Supreme Court of
Virginia, in its 1985 Cape Henry Towers decision, crafted a referent that

36.

Id. at 353.

37. See Jordan v. Sandwell, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 406, 413 (W.D. Va. 2002)
(explaining that the court's decision in Wiggins "caused considerable legislative
gnashing of teeth," as Virginia's legislators felt that the federal court had altered the
nature of the statute from a real improvements statute of repose to a general
products liability statute of repose); Cape Henry Towers, 331 S.E.2d at 479 (recounting
an unpublished 1973 report of the House of Delegates Committee for Courts of
Justice emphasizing that the provision was never intended to safeguard
manufacturers of equipment or machinery and that the Wiggins decision was an
erroneous interpretation").
38. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250.
39. Id.; see Cape Henry Towers, 331 S.E.2d at 479 (stating that the amendment was
effected in clear response to Wiggins and with the apparent goal of supplanting the
Wiggins ruling).
40. SeeJamerson v. Coleman-Adams Constr., Inc., 699 S.E.2d 197, 199 (Va. 2010)
(acknowledging that cases subsequent to the 1973 amendment have revolved around
whether the products or items at issue were "equipment" and "machinery").
41. See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 120 (2013) (explicating the statutory
interpretation doctrine of expressio unius est exlusio alterius,whereby the expression of
one thing implies the exclusion of another).
42. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250 (making no mention of any particular
nomenclature for the class of improvements not qualifying as "equipment or
machinery").
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would come to shape all subsequent applications and interpretations
of Virginia Code section 8.01-250."s
The court in Cape Henry Towers looked to legislative intent and
found that, at its heart, the 1973 amendment was attempting to
distinguish between "equipment or machinery" and what the court
called "ordinary building materials."" At the time, the court did little
to define this term of art or differentiate it from "equipment" or
"machinery" and simply noted two things. First, "ordinary building
materials" are generally incorporated into improvements to real
property by design professionals and contractors outside the control
of their manufacturers or suppliers. 5 Second, "equipment" and
"machinery," unlike "ordinary building materials," are usually
subjected to quality-control measures and manufacturer's warranties,
which are voidable if the "equipment or machinery" is improperly
installed or operated.46 Applying these two distinctions, the court
found that the four-by-eight foot exterior building panels used in the
construction of the Cape Henry Towers condominium buildings were
"ordinary building materials" within the meaning of the statute.47 In
other words, the manufacturer was entitled to the five-year protection
offered through the statute of repose.4 8

43. See Cape Henry Towers, 331 S.E.2d at 480 (referring to the type of
improvements not falling into the class of "equipment" and "machinery" as "ordinary
building materials"); see also amerson, 699 S.E.2d at 199 (explaining that since the
Cape Henry Towers decision, which was the first case to address the 1973 amendment,
Virginia courts have analyzed whether the item at issue was "equipment" and
"machinery" or an "ordinary building material").
44. Cape Henry Towers, 331 S.E.2d at 480 ("We conclude that the General
Assembly intended to perpetuate a distinction between, on one hand, those who
furnish ordinary building materials.., and, on the other hand, those who furnish
machinery or equipment.").
45. Id.; see also City of Richmond, Va. v. Madison Mgmt. Grp., 918 F.2d 438, 445
(4th Cir. 1990) (applying this factor and expanding upon it by holding that although
the defendant manufacturer of cement water pipes did not actually install the pipes,
the defendant "exercised control over the structural integrity of the pipes' by
assisting the engineer in designing and developing the "shop drawings and lay
schedules" for installation, and the pipes were thus more like "equipment" than
"ordinary building materials," as the pipes were not "outside the control" of the
defendant). Note that the Richmond court failed to explain how the defendant's
assisting the engineer with shop drawings and lay schedules translated into an
exercising of control. See id. at 445 (jumping from the defendant's involvement with
shop drawings and lay schedules to the conclusion that the statute of repose did not
bar the plaintiffs claim).
46. Cape Henry Towers, 331 S.E.2d at 480.
47. See id. at 481 (affirming the ruling of the lower court, the Circuit Court of the
City of Virginia Beach).
48. Id. at 477-78.
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D. Post-Cape Henry Towers: Attempts to Distinguish "OrdinaryBuilding
Materials"from "Equipment"and "Machinery"
After the Supreme Court of Virginia's initial analysis of Virginia
Code section 8.01-250, a series of cases followed in which the
judiciary grappled with the concept of "ordinary building materials"
and attempted to delineate the definitional boundaries of "ordinary
building materials" as opposed to "equipment" and "machinery."
Three years after its decision in Cape Henry Towers, the Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled in Grice v. Hungerford Mechanical Corp.49 that
an electrical panel box and its component parts (including the panel
enclosure, the bus bar, the circuit breakers, and the grounding
material) were "ordinary building materials.""° The court relied
loosely on its initial analysis in Cape Henry Towers, but also noted that
the instructions and plans for integrating the items into the structure
came not from the manufacturer, but rather, from the architects and
design professionals involved in the project.5 In so doing, the court
enumerated an additional factor relevant for distinguishing "ordinary
building materials" from "equipment" and "machinery": whether the
manufacturer produced the item for a specific purpose or provided
2
explicit directions for the installation of the item.
Grice was only the beginning of the test's expansion. In 1998, the
5
Supreme Court of Virginia heard Luebbers v. Fort Wayne Plastics, Inc.
In Luebbers, the estate of a swimmer who died in a private swimming
pool accident brought an action against the manufacturer of various
structural components used in the pool's construction, including
vinyl pool liners and steel braces. 4 In holding that these items were
"ordinary building materials," the court expounded upon the quality
control and warranty test enunciated in Cape Henry Towers.55 It
emphasized that quality-control measures must be formalized and
49. 374 S.E.2d 17 (Va. 1988).
50. Id. at 19 (affirming the trial court's judgment that the items at issue were
"ordinary building materials" within the meaning of section 8.01-250 and stating that
the plaintiff's claims against the manufacturer were therefore time-barred).
51. See id. at 18-19.
52. Compare id. at 19 (considering, for the first time, whether the item at issue was
manufactured for a specific project or whether the item was accompanied by
instructions or guidance for its installation into that specific project), with Cape Henry
Towers, 331 S.E.2d at 478-80 (omitting any consideration regarding the effect of
custom manufacturing or specific instructions).
53. 498 S.E.2d 911 (Va. 1998).
54. Id. at 911-12.
55. See id. at 913; Cape Henry Towers, 331 S.E.2d at 480 (noting that "equipment"
and "machinery," unlike "ordinary building materials," are usually subjected to
quality-control measures as well as manufacturer's warranties, which are voidable if
the "equipment" or "machinery" is improperly installed or operated).
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warranties must be specific
in order to tip the scales towards
56
"equipment or machinery."

The Luebbers court also attempted to apply the specific design test
articulated in Grice." However, in attempting to apply this test, the
court actually enunciated a new factor based on the fungibility of the
product at issue. In its evaluation of the vinyl pool liners and steel
braces, the court noted that the manufacturer did not design the
items for use in a particular pool.59 Rather, the court found that
these vinyl pool liners and steel braces were generally
interchangeable with other component products within the private
swimming pool construction industry and were "clearly fungible."6
The court concluded that the items at issue were "ordinary building
materials" and their manufacturers were thus entitled to the
protection of the statute.6
Through this reasoning, the court
56. See Luebbers, 498 S.E.2d at 913 (stating that simply reviewing a product after its
completion or warranting a product against general defects in workmanship is not
the kind of "close quality control" that courts associate with "equipment" or
"machinery"). The court refused to recognize a system of "close quality control"
where the defendant manufacturer merely warranted that the materials were free
from general defects in workmanship and welding. Id.; see alsoJamerson v. ColemanAdams Constr., Inc., 699 S.E.2d 197, 200 (Va. 2010) (declining to find a system of
"close quality control" where a licensed welder briefly reviewed the welds of a fire
pole and platform after assembly).
The court refrained from recognizing an
independent manufacturer's warranty where the alleged warranty was not
documented, was never communicated to the purchaser, and was merely a policy of
the manufacturer to stand behind its work. See id.
57. See Luebbers, 498 S.E.2d at 913 (indicating that Fort Wayne, a manufacturer of
structural component materials for in-ground swimming pools, produced
interchangeable parts which were accompanied by general installation manuals);
Gfice v. Hungerford Mech. Corp., 374 S.E.2d 17, 18 (Va. 1988) (establishing that
whether the manufacturer produced the item for a specific purpose or provided
explicit directions for the installation of the item is another factor relevant for the
distinction of "ordinary building materials" from "machinery" and "equipment"); see
also Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 200 (declining to find that the manufacturer had
provided specific instructions where the "installation instructions" for a fire pole and
platform consisted only of suggested types of bolts that could be used to install the
pole and platform).
58. See Luebbers, 498 S.E.2d at 913 (alleging to analyze specific design but actually
discussing fungibility). The difference between the specific design test and the
fungibility test is nuanced: the specific design test focuses on the manufacturer's acts
and intentions, while the fungibility test, which is more product-centric, focuses less
on the actions of the manufacturer and more on the nature of the item itself.
Compare id. (applying the fungibility test and concentrating on the characteristics of
the swimming pool components), with Gice, 374 S.E.2d at 19 (applying the specific
design test and concentrating on the fact that decisions regarding the quality of
components for an electrical box were made by the architect and not the
manufacturer).
59. See Luebbers, 498 S.E.2d at 913 (commenting that the distributors periodically
bought the products in bulk to be used in the construction of future swimming pools
as per the plans and desires of specific clients).
60. Id. ("Individually, these items served no function other than as generic
materials to be included in the larger whole . .
61. Id.
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distinguished fungibility from the specific design test and implied
that higher levels of fungibility are generally associated with "ordinary
building materials."6 2 That is, "ordinary building materials" are
generally interchangeable with other similar products.6"
In 2000, the Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted the statute in
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Melendez.64 In Cooper, a Navy employee sued a
switchgear manufacturer for burn injuries caused by the explosion of
a circuit breaker during a submarine pier renovation project.6 5 Here,
the court used two aspects of the burgeoning case law in this area 66:
the Cape Henry Towers definition of "ordinary building materials"67
and the Luebbers fungibility test.6" In designating the products as
"equipment," the court partially focused on the fact that the
industrial circuit breakers and switchgears were components of the
docked submarines' electrical systems. 69 That is, they were not
essential elements of the pier itself.7 " Noting this distinction, the
court determined that the products were not actually "incorporated
into [the] construction work" as required by the Cape Henry Towers
definition of "ordinary building materials."7'
The court's decision also relied on considerations of fungibility, as
the manufacturer of the switchgear had designated the use of a
particular breaker in its materials list.72 Notably, the court looked to
the purpose of the items and deemed the circuit breaker and
switchgears' provision of electricity to the docked submarines to be

an adjunct function-a function distinct from the construction or

62. See id. (referencing fungibility apart from any specific design plans on behalf
of the manufacturer).
63. See id. (explaining that the materials incorporated into the swimming pool
were generic materials and were not unique to the project).
64. 537 S.E.2d 580 (Va. 2000).
65. Id. at 582.
66. See id. at 588-90.
67. Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 331 S.E.2d 476, 480 (Va. 1985)
(concluding that the legislature intended to maintain a distinction between
furnishers of ordinary building materials and furnishers of machinery or
equipment).
68. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
69. See Cooper,537 S.E.2d at 590.
70. Id. (describing the characterization of the industrial circuit breakers and
switchgears as essential to the existence of the pier as a "mischaracterization").
71. Id. at 588, 590 (quoting Cape Henry Towers, 331 S.E.2d at 480) (emphasizing
the location of the circuit breakers, which were installed under the deck of the pier,
and of the switchgears, which were affixed to the rails of the pier).
72. Id. at 589-90 (insisting that the manufacturer's specification of a "K-Don"
breaker created the presumption that the breaker and switchgear were "mated
component[s]," and as a result the products were not fungible or generic (alteration
in original)).
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existence of the pier itself.7" The court thereby enunciated a new
consideration-the adjunct function. v4
In 2010, the Supreme Court of Virginia again examined the
framework for analyzing section 8.01-250. In Jamerson, a fireman
suffered injuries after a firehouse pole and platform collapsed
beneath him. 5 Before concluding that the pole and platform were
"ordinary building materials," the court applied multiple factors
distinguishing "ordinary building materials" from "equipment" or
"machinery," including the Cape Henry Towers "ordinary building
materials" definition. 76 However, in response to the plaintiffs claim
that the pole and platform had been specially designed for the
firehouse and were thus more like "equipment" or "machinery, "v the
78
court expanded upon and attempted to clarify the fungibility test.
The court noted that a product does not need to be a practical
duplicate of all other competitor products to be characterized as
fungible. v9
One year after the Jamerson decision, the Virginia Supreme Court
attempted to interpret and clarify the statute's multi-factor test in
0 In this case, the insurer of
Royal Indemnity Co. v. Tyco Fire Products."
an apartment complex sued a manufacturer of allegedly defective
sprinkler heads after a fire damaged the property.'
The court
applied four factors of the test, including the adjunct function 2 and
specific instructions analyses, 3 the Cape Henry Towers definition of

73. See id. at 590 (contending that in relation to Pier 23, the circuit breakers and
switchgears were discrete items not a part of the pier's electrical system, but rather a
part of the electrical systems of the submarines, which functioned in lieu of the
submarines' engines or generators).
74. See id. (considering explicitly for the first time any adjunct functions of the
item at issue); see also Grice v. Hungerford Mech. Corp., 374 S.E.2d 17, 18-19 (Va.
1988) (failing to explicitly consider any adjunct functions of the item at issue).
75. Jamerson v. Coleman-Adams Constr., Inc., 699 S.E.2d 197, 198 (Va. 2010).
76. Id. at 200 (indicating that the pole and platform served as a manner of entry
that was essential to and integrated into the firehouse structure).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 200-01.
79. See id. (explaining that a novel or tailored structural product is not per se
excluded from the class of "ordinary building materials"). "For example, a nonstandard ramp, door, or set of stairs built to certain specifications to allow access to
or in a home does not by virtue of that one-of-a-kind nature transform... ordinary
building materials into machinery or equipment." Id.
80. 704 S.E.2d 91 (Va. 2011).
81. Id. at 92-93.
82. See id. at 96 (holding that sprinkler heads are not functional components of a
structure and finding instead that they are installed into larger sprinkler systems to
serve an adjunct function-protection from fire).
83. See id. (observing that the individually shipped sprinkler heads were
accompanied by "technical data sheet[s]" that contained information and
instructions for installation).
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"ordinary building materials,"84 and the quality-control and
independent-warranty assessments.8 5 However, the court made no
substantive alterations or expansions to any of the factors.86 Rather,
the court administered each of the enumerated factors and found
that in each case the sprinkler heads were more 8like
"equipment" and
"machinery" than "ordinary building materials." 7
Overall, between 1985 and 2011, Cape Henry Towers and its progeny
have established a six-pronged test for distinguishing between
"ordinary building materials" and "equipment" or "machinery" and
have thus established the bounds of Virginia Code section 8.01-250.
Under this test, courts ask whether the item (1) is unincorporated
from the construction work; 8 (2) was under the control of its
manufacturer during its installation;" (3) was subject to close quality
control at the factory or subject to manufacturer's warranties;9" (4)
was manufactured for a specific project and was accompanied by
instructions or guidance for its installation into that specific project;9
(5) is non-fungible;92 and (6) serves an adjunct purpose.
In
applying these factors, courts have given no guidance other than
concluding that affirmative answers to the above-mentioned
questions are generally indicative of "equipment" and "machinery,"
while negative answers to these questions are generally indicative of
"ordinary building materials." Theoretically, each question within
this scheme is simple, but in practice, without more guidance as to
their collective application, these questions have produced a complex
web ofjurisprudence for courts and litigants to navigate.9"

84. See id. (refusing to deem sprinkler heads essential components of buildings
or other structures).
85. See id. (announcing that sprinkler heads are clearly within the class of
products that are produced under the scrutiny of close quality control and bound by
independent manufacturers' warranties).
86. See id. at 96-97 (accepting the current jurisprudential framework and merely
applying the factors to the fact pattern at hand).
87. See id. at 96.
88. See Cape Henry Towers, Inc. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 331 S.E.2d 476, 480 (Va.
1985).
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. SeeGrice v. Hungerford Mech. Corp., 374 S.E.2d 17, 19 (Va. 1988).
92. See Luebbers v. Fort Wayne Plastics, Inc., 498 S.E.2d 911, 913 (Va. 1998).
93. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Melendez, 537 S.E.2d 580, 590 (Va. 2000).
94. SeeJamerson v. Coleman-Adams Constr., Inc., 699 S.E.2d 197, 201 (Va. 2010)
(Mims, J., concurring) (rebuffing the multi-factor test as a "confusing path").
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E. JusticeMims'Response to the "OrdinaryBuilding Materials"
Jurisprudence
In the Supreme Court of Virginia's 2010 Jamerson decision, Justice
Mims outlined his assault on the "ordinary building materials"
jurisprudence in a concurring opinion.95 He noted that due to the
legislature's failure to define statutory terms, the judiciary's
interpretation attempts have been unhelpful, if not futile.96 Justice
Mims responded to the majority's admission that the jurisprudential
test lacks structure and pinpointed the lack of structure as the root of
the problem.97 Furthermore, Justice Mims chastised the court's
hesitancy to define the statute's relevant terms.9" He noted that
nothing within the language of the provision suggests that the
legislature intended courts to deconstruct intricate improvements to
real property element-by-element and classify each item as either an
"ordinary building material" or a piece of "equipment" or
machinery."'
In place of the current complex "ordinary building materials"
jurisprudence, Justice Mims has advocated for a common-sense
understanding of the plain language of the statute.10 ° He maintained
that, ideally, the legislature would define prominent terms, but noted
that in the absence of such legislative thoroughness, courts should
turn to complementary Code sections for guidance. 1 In that vein,
95. Id. (condemning the current judicial analysis as one of "unnecessary
complexity"). One year after the Jamerson decision, Justice Mims reaffirmed his
criticism of the "ordinary building materials" jurisprudence in a shorter second
concurrence. See Royal Indem. Co. v. Tyco Fire Prods. LP, 704 S.E.2d 91, 99 (Va.
2011) (Mims, J., concurring) (objecting to the test as a "tortured, non-statutory...
analysis").
96. See Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 201 (Mims, J., concurring) (explaining that
because the term is not present in the statute and eludes precise definition,
explanatory efforts from the bench have spawned "more heat than light"); see also id.
at 204 (arguing that the circumstantial approach to the statute has shown itself to be
an unfeasible option, as demonstrated by the "frequency of these cases and the
complexity of the analysis").
97. See id. at 201 ("[T] herein lies the fault-in cases laden with complex facts, an
analysis that itself is more complex than the plain language of the statute requires
and is overly dependent on circumstances offers scant useful legal guidance"); see also
id. at 204-05 (emphasizing the irony of the majority's concession that the "ordinary
building materials"jurisprudence imparts no uniform framework for its application).
98. See id. at 204 (admonishing the majority for essentially admitting that it
cannot define "ordinary building materials" but assuring that it "know[s] it when [it]
sees it" (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring))).
99. See id. at 202 (rejecting the unrestrained reductionist tendencies of the

majority).

100. Id. at 205 (stating that the 1973 amendment was enacted "to exclude
machinery and equipment-terms that are not difficult to define or understand").
101. Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank of Richmond v. Holland, 39 S.E. 126, 129 (Va.
1901)) (urging that where statutory provisions are ambiguous and courts require

2013]

SLAYING THE JURISPRUDENTIAL BEAST

1753

Justice Mims referenced and suggested a definition found in the
Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code. 10 2 Within that Code, the
idea of "equipment" is not explicitly defined, but it is outlined
through ostensive definition, such that readers are provided with
examples of items qualifying as "equipment" and "machinery. '"103
Overall, although Justice Mims' criticism and subsequent suggestion
have done much to illuminate the troubles and unviability of the
current jurisprudence, there is more to be said on the matter.
II.

THE CURRENT TEST FOR "ORDINARY BUILDING MATERIALS" AS

DERIVED FROM CAPE HENRY ToWERs AND ITS PROGENY IS UNWORKABLE

A.

The Current Test Is Unnecessarily CumbersomeDue to Its Overwhelming
Number of Factors and Lack of Guidance

Two separate but related issues contribute to the current test's
cumbersome application. First, the sheer multitude of factors makes
the test difficult to use.1" 4 Generally, when judicial tests are overly
cumbersome or involve a host of factors, courts often become bogged
down and selectively apply the prongs of the test, potentially
producing inconsistent results.10 ' The Cape Henry Towers line of cases
is no exception: the Cape Henry Towers court applied three factors;
guidance in interpretation, courts may rightly turn to other Code provisions that
utilize the same terms).
102. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-97 to -119 (2009); seeJamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 205 (Mims,
J., concurring) (referencing the Uniform Statewide Building Code as the "bible" of
the construction trades). The Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code establishes
the construction standards for new buildings and structures, as well as additions,
rehabilitations, or changes in use of existing buildings and structures. See Virginia
Uniform Statewide Building Code (USBC), VA. DEP'T HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV.,
http://www.dhcd.virginia.gov/index.php/va-building-codes/building-and-fire-codes/
regulations/uniform-statewide-building-code-usbc.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2013).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-97 (defining "equipment" as "plumbing, heating,
electrical, ventilating, air-conditioning and refrigeration equipment, elevators,
dumbwaiters, escalators, and other mechanical additions or installations"); see also
Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 205 (Mims, J., concurring) (supplementing the Virginia
Uniform Statewide Building Code by remarking that machinery clearly includes "that
which is supplied by the user of the building for the processes performed therein
and which is not related to the function of the building qua buildingmanufacturing machinery, printing presses, large computers, and the like").
104. See Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 205 (Mims, J., concurring) (emphasizing the
unworkable nature of the test). See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1646 (2006)
(referencing social science research and suggesting that multi-factor tests should
ideally not exceed three or four factors).
105. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Supreme Court's Current Doctrine of Stare
Decisis RequireAdherence to the Supreme Court's CurrentDoctrine of StareDecisis?, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1165, 1173 (2008) (opining that nebulous judicially-constructed tests that are
not firmly anchored in legal texts or traditions are prone to producing irregular
application).
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the Grice court applied two factors; the Luebbers court applied three
factors; the Cooper court applied three factors; the Jamerson court
applied four factors; and the Royal Indemnity Co. court applied four
106

factors.

The second aspect contributing to the test's cumbersome nature is
the lack of guidance for applying its six prongs. Over the years, the
Virginia Supreme Court has gone out of its way to emphasize the
test's nebulous quality and variability. °7 The court noted in its 2010
Jamerson decision that in parsing the classes of "ordinary building
materials" from "equipment" and "machinery," the outcome of any
particular case will be fact-driven and not based on any one prong of
the test.l0 ' Therefore, although the court has indicated that no
prong of the test will be outcome-determinative, the court still
provides no guidance on how to resolve conflicting prongs of the test
109
or how to determine the appropriate number of factors to apply.
As a general rule, a court's failure to provide adequate guidance
regarding the application of a multi-factor test inevitably results in
confusion about which factors are necessary and sufficient for a
complete and thorough application of the test."0 Such failure can
also cause courts difficulty in resolving tension among the various
factors."' Lastly, complex factor-based tests that include no guiding

106. See supra Part I.C-D (describing the evolution of the "ordinary building
materials" judicial test).
107. SeeJamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 199 ("As reflected in [the Cape Henry Towers line of
cases], we have identified various characteristics of the items in question, which, in a
specific case, led to the determination that these items were or were not ordinary
building materials. Nevertheless, we have not held any single characteristic or set of
characteristics as determinative of the issue. Each case has been and must be
decided based on its own circumstances.").
108. Id.
109. See supra Part I.C-D (detailing the current state of the test but making no
indication of any prevailing framework for the application of the test); see, e.g., Royal
Indem. Co. v. Tyco Fire Prods. LP, 704 S.E.2d 91, 96 (Va. 2011) (applying four of the
"ordinary building materials" factors but providing no formula for weighing the
factors against each other and issuing no justification for the particular factors
selected).
110. See Paulsen, supra note 105, at 1200 (discussing the Supreme Court's current
five-factor test for stare decisis and noting that generally, because the importance of
each factor in a multi-factor test is unclear and the correlation between factors is not
catalogued, "[n] o factor is necessarily necessary" and "[n] o factor is sufficient").
111. See Beebe, supra note 104, at 1645-46 (observing that multi-prong tests
containing an abundance of factors may in fact overburden the judiciary's capacity to
balance conflicting facets and "may simply result in the stampeding of less significant
factors"); see also Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and CriminalSanctions in the Constitution
and Courts, 94 GEO. LJ. 1, 36 (2005) (decrying a flaw in the concept of multi-factor
tests, as it is seldom apparent how clashing or antithetical prongs should be
reconciled).
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1
framework often decay and collapse into unilateral court decisions. 2
Similarly, the judicial test for "ordinary building materials" is a
complex matrix of variables that is devoid of guidance. As such, it
faces all of these concerns, invites these problems into its application,
and ultimately undermines its own legitimacy 113 by producing
conflicting results.114

B.

The Current Test Comprises ConflictingJudicialStandards that Produce
InconsistentResults

The current judicial test for "ordinary building materials" allows for
conflicting judicial standards and inconsistent outcomes.1 15 In
comparing the Cooper and Jamerson decisions, although both courts
purported to apply the fungibility test, the courts' standards for
fungibility differed quite significantly. 116 In Cooper, the court held
that because the switchgear manufacturer had named a certain
breaker for use in its materials list, the two items were presumed to be
mated, and the circuit breaker was thus non-fungible and was more
like "equipment" than "ordinary building materials."117 The Cooper
court withheld the "fungible" label from the circuit breaker simply by
virtue of the fact that the switchgear manufacturer's materials list
suggested the use of a particular breaker, despite there being no

112. See Fellmeth, supra note 111, at 36-37 (conceding that multi-prong tests may
produce cogent direction when all or most of the prongs support one outcome, but
insisting that this is an extremely rare occurrence and maintaining that in the
majority of circumstances a multi-factor test usually produces a discretionary test that
provides negligible value to the judiciary and "a subjective judgment [that] is merely
clothed with the legitimacy of an ostensibly reasoned decision"). See generally
Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275, 1283
(7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (espousing a "reluctan[ce] to accept an
approach that calls on the.., judge to throw a heap of factors on a table and then
slice and dice to taste"); Alex E. Rogers, Clothing State Governmental Entities with
Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the-State Doctrine, 92
COLUM. L. REV. 1243, 1273 (1992) (characterizing multi-factor tests as
exemplifications of "ad hoc balancing" rather than judicial standards).
113. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text (citing the lack of guidance
within the "ordinary building materials"jurisprudential framework).
114. See infra Part II.B (describing the current test's inconsistent results and
standards).
115. See generally Thomas W. McNamara, Defining a Single Entity for Purposes of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act Post Copperweld: A Suggested Approach, 22 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 1245, 1267 (1985) (stating that any proposed test should produce consistent
results).
116. CompareJamersonv. Coleman-Adams Constr., Inc., 699 S.E.2d 197, 200 (Va.
2010) (applying a lenient standard for fungibility), with Cooper Indus., Inc. v.
Melendez, 537 S.E.2d 580, 590 (Va. 2000) (applying a stringent standard for
fungbility).
117. Cooper, 537 S.E.2d at 590.
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indication that the actual breaker itself had been customized or
tailored in any way for use with the manufacturer's switchgear." 8
The court in Jamerson, however, concluded that a firehouse
platform and pole, which had been made-to-order for the particular
space, were still fungible and were thus "ordinary building
materials."" 9 The Jamerson court justified its ruling by noting that a
product's customized attributes do not automatically remove the
product from the class of fungible "ordinary building materials." 2 '
Notwithstanding the judiciary's efforts to explain or rectify the two
assessments, these two cases demonstrate fundamentally differing
approaches to the concept of fungibility, and the inevitability of
conflicting results.' 2 ' By employing divergent judicial standards, the
courts infused confusion and uncertainty into the "ordinary building
materials" jurisprudence, thus marring doctrinal clarity and
predictability for litigants and industry players. 22
This
unpredictability runs contrary to the most basic intentions of a statute
of repose and is therefore an unacceptable consequence of the
123
current "ordinary building materials" test.
C. The Current Test ProducesResults that are Incompatible with Modern
Technological Ideals and the Evolution of "Ordinary"
In further display of the unworkable nature of the "ordinary
building materials" jurisprudence, the current test also produces
results that are inconsistent with modern conceptions of
infrastructure and advancing technologies. As technology advances,
so do society's notions about what is "ordinary."'2 4 "Ordinary" is not a
stagnant concept; rather, it is fluid and dynamic.'25 Thus, what was

118. See id.
119. Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 201.

120. Id. at 200-01.

121. Compare id. at 200 (allowing obviously-customized products to be categorized
as "ordinary building materials"), with Cooper, 537 S.E.2d at 590 (excluding from
"ordinary building materials" stock products that interact with other customized

products).
122. Cf Reed W. L. Marcy, Patent Law's Nonobviousness Requirement: The Effect of
Inconsistent Standards Regarding Commercial Success on the Individual Inventor, 19
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 199, 203 (1996) (reporting the undermining effect that
inconsistentjudicial standards have upon predictability within patent law).
123. See generally supra Part I.A (chronicling the broad legislative values of finality
and certainty underlying statutes of repose).
124. See generally Susan W. Brenner, Law in an Era of Pervasive Technology, 15
WIDENER L.J. 667, 670 (2006) (contending that the ramifications of technology
permeate through culture and alter everyday life in both drastic and nuanced ways).
125. Cf Jeffrey W. Childers, Kyllo v. United States: A Temporary Reprieve from
Technology-Enhanced Surveillance of the Home, 81 N.C. L. REv. 728, 768 (2003)
(explaining that the "in general public use" standard that the Kyllo Court employed
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once considered "ordinary" may now be antiquated or even
irrelevant, 126 and what was once revolutionary and unprecedented
may now be commonplace. 2 7 In the same vein, features of certain
items, products, or structures that were once considered novel or
128
even groundbreaking may now be standard additions.
In applying the current "ordinary building materials" test, courts
disregard the nuanced concept of technological evolution as it affects
societal perceptions of the ordinary. In City of Richmond, Virginia v.
Madison Management Group, Inc.,129 for example, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit deemed cement piping used in the
construction of a city's water transmission main to be "equipment"
and "machinery" for purposes of the statute of repose. 3 ' Although
there are many complex considerations involved in the successful
installation of a water transport system,' the actual pipes that make
up such a system remain mere conduits or tubes. 3 2 The first
individuals attempting to establish water transmission systems may
have faced a progressive and daunting feat,' but with the passage of

to analyze sense-enhancing technological instruments "is fluid and will change with
advances in technology").
126. See, e.g., Bianca Bosker, You're Out: 20 Things That Became Obsolete This Decade,
HUFFINGTON Posr (May 25, 2011, 7:20 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/12/22/
obsolete-things-decade n_800240.html (classifying travel agencies, CDs, and VHS
tapes as examples of things that are no longer commonplace).
127. See, e.g., Denise Ngo, Archive Gallery: The Rise of Personal Computers, PoPULAR
Sci. (May 13, 2011, 11:55 AM), http://www.popsci.com/gadgets/article/201105/archive-gallery-rise-personal-computers (detailing the journey of the personal
computer from remote luxury to "everyday necessity").
128. See, e.g., A World Secured: A History of the Zipper from Novelty to Ubiquity,
RANDOMHISTORY.cOM (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.randomhistory.com/zipperhistory.html (chronicling the incorporation of zippers into clothing, shoes, and
other items and their subsequent emergence from "obscure novelty" to "fully
trendy"). See generally RIcHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS 5 (2002)
(referencing modern society's constant revision and enhancement of all products).
129. 918 F.2d 438 (4th Cir. 1990).
130. Id. at 445; see also supra note 45 (stating that because the pipes were subject to
close quality control at the factory, the court found that the pipes were more like
"equipment" than "ordinary building materials"; therefore, the statute of repose did
not bar the city's claim).
131. See, e.g., Mark E. Hughes, All About Watermains-An Insider's View, PDHONLINE
18 (2012), http://www.pdhcenter.com/courses/c198/c198content.pdf (detailing
the many concerns of successful water-main construction including the proximity to
sewer lines and storm drains, the distance from topsoil, and the climate of the
installation site).
132. See Water MainDefinition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dicionary.reference.com/browse
/water+main (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) (defining a "water main" as "a main pipe or
conduit in a system for conveying water").
133. See e.g., Michael Cooper, Aging of Water Mains Is Becoming Hard To Ignore, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 17, 2009) http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/us/18water.html
(describing the early-American water-transport systems constructed from "barrel-like
pipes or bored-out logs").
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time and advancing technologies, this task has become routine and
1

ordinary.

1

4

Moreover, it is necessary to separate the complexity of the overall
task or idea from the potential complexity of the specific products
used to accomplish the task.' 35 From this perspective, the broader
task of providing and transporting water to the public is the complex
endeavor, while the cement piping is just one of many simpler
components that makes the task logistically possible. The Fourth
Circuit ignored the progression of modern piping, its relative
simplicity, and its commonality in improvements to real property.'
Thus, the Richmond court's designation of cement pipes as machinery
rather than "ordinary building materials" is contrary to modern
notions regarding
advancements in technology and the evolution of
13 7
the "ordinary.'

1

Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit is not the only court to apply the
"ordinary building materials" test in a manner that produces results
inconsistent with modern ideas. The Supreme Court of Virginia
applied the test to sprinkler heads in its 2011 Royal Indemnity Co.
decision. 13 In classifying the sprinkler heads as "equipment" and
"machinery," the court noted that fire prevention was, in fact, an
adjunct function.3 9 When pressed, however, the concept of adjunct
functions leads to two related concerns. 4 ' First, the adjunct function
reasoning necessarily views buildings and other improvements in
their most rudimentary form-refusing to allow any technological
advancement to "attach" to or be associated with the structure itself.
Rather, the test requires that if the item or product at issue
contributes anything supplementary to structural existence or
architectural integrity, then it serves an adjunct purpose and is more
134. See generally Hughes, supra note 131 (detailing established best-practices for
installing and maintaining a water main); supra notes 124-128 (recounting the
advancement of technology as it relates to the evolution of the concept of
"ordinary").
135. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, AN ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 159-62
(Roger Woolhouse ed. 1997) (enunciating the theory of ideas whereby every

complex idea can be analyzed and broken down into component parts or simpler
ideas).

136. City of Richmond, Va. v. Madison Mgmt. Grp., 918 F.2d 438, 444-45 (4th Cir.
1990) (stating that because pipes are "relatively sophisticated discrete materials" and
are "more like equipment and less like ordinary building materials," the statute of
repose did not apply to the manufacturers).
137. See generally supra notes 124-128 (discussing improvements in technology as

they pertain to the advancing concept of "ordinary").
138. See Royal Indem. Co. v. Tyco Fire Prods. LP, 704 S.E.2d 91, 92, 96 (Va. 2011).
139. Id. at 94, 96.
140. See generally Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Melendez, 537 S.E.2d 580, 590 (Va. 2000)
(considering the functions of switchgears and circuit breakers to exemplify flaws in

the adjunct function analysis).
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like "equipment" and "machinery" than an "ordinary building
" ' In Royal Indemnity Co.,
material."14
the court ruled that sprinkler
heads performed a distinct job and were not necessary construction
elements. 42 As time passes, however, society expects more from
modern structures and buildings.'43 Today, through building codes
and regulations, legislatures express this expectation.'
Thus, if we
perceive law as an "index of social thought,"'45 the adjunct function
test's restrictive approach to structures and improvements is
fundamentally at odds with society's modern ideals of advancement
and the betterment of structural standards.
The second concern with the adjunct function factor of the
"ordinary building materials" test centers on its potentially peculiar
results. 146
If fire protection products are not "functional
component[s] in the construction" of buildings, 147 then what other
features may be deemed to serve adjunct functions? In addition to
the structural function of allowing entry into a building, do doors
serve an adjunct function in protecting those buildings from the
elements? Is insulation more like "equipment" and "machinery"
because it fortifies against extreme temperatures yet is nonessential to
the most basic physical structure of the building? When carried to its
logical conclusion, the hypothetical results of the adjunct function
141. See, e.g., id. (classifying a circuit breaker's provision of electricity to a nuclear
submarine pier as an adjunct function that was distinct from the construction of the
pier itself).
142. RoyalIndem. Co., 704 S.E.2d at96.
143. See Andrew Alpern, Note, Statutes of Repose and the Construction Industry: A
Proposalfor New York, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 1975, 2003 (1991) (declaring that with time,
"technology has changed, [and] so too have the attitudes towards structures"). Gone
are the days in which society regarded catastrophes such as the Triangle Shirtwaist
Fire as an acceptable part of life. See Saru Jayaraman, From Triangle Shirtwaist to
Windows on the World: Restaurants as the New Sweatshops, 14 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 625, 629 (2011) (noting that prior to the fire, various strikes and movements
aimed at increasing fire safety and bettering workplace conditions had failed);
Arthur F. McEvoy, The Triangle ShirtwaistFactory Fire of 1911: Social Change, Industrial
Accidents, and the Evaluation of Common-Sense Causality, 20 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 621,
623, 629 (1994) (recounting how the factory fire, which killed 146 people as they
tried to escape through the building's inward-opening doors and single full-length
staircase, acted as a catalyst for progressive era factory and building reforms).
144. See, e.g., Virginia Receives High Rankingfor Building Code, WAFB (June 12, 2012,
6:01 PM), http://www.wafb.com/story/18731943/virginia-receives-high-ranking-forbuilding-code (describing Virginia's new Code provision, which requires all new
construction to abide by specific wind-bracing requirements by strategically placing
anchor bolts to secure a building's framing to its foundation for hurricane
protection).
145. McEvoy, supra note 143, at 625.
146. SeeJamerson v. Coleman-Adams Constr., Inc., 699 S.E.2d 197, 205 (Va. 2010)
(Mims, J., concurring) (examining the reductio ad absurdum of the "ordinary building
materials"jurisprudence through an analysis of structural steel).
147. Royal Indem. Co., 704 S.E.2d at 96 (declining to categorize fire-protection
products as integral to the construction of the apartment building at issue).
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test appear to answer "yes" to such questions. To a certain extent,
however, most items or components can be reasoned to serve an
adjunct purpose in some manner.1 48 Such an ad hoc analysis is
unhelpful in attempting to provide meaningful classifications 49 and,
again, offends modern notions regarding 0 the advancement of
5
ordinary technology and construction norms.
The inconsistent manner in which the Fourth Circuit and the
Supreme Court of Virginia have applied the adjunct function test,
while philosophically interesting, has had a practical consequence as
well. These inconsistencies trickle down to litigants and trial courts,
causing widespread confusion, 151 generating uncertainty about
potential liabilities,

52

and fostering excess appellate litigation.13

A

statute of repose is meant to reduce potential liability over time, but
such unpredictability undermines that purpose. 154 Not surprisingly,
at least one member of the bench has criticized the burdensome
nature of the test, as well as the resulting contradictions and
undesirable consequences of the "ordinary building materials"
jurisprudence.

155

148. See generallyJo Anne Hagen, An Overview of U.S. Import/Export Regulations-Part
I, Exports, COLO. LAw., July 2003, at 75, 77 ("Many products have dual uses .... ").
149. See generally Rogers, supra note 112, at 1273 (maintaining that ad hoc
reasoning does not provide for or contribute to judicially manageable standards
within the context of the arm-of-the-state doctrine).
150. See generally supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text (examining
progressing technology and its transformative effect on notions of what is
"ordinary").
151. See Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 201 (Mims, J., concurring) (asserting that
confusion regarding the jurisprudence is clear in virtue of the sheer number of cases
in which the courts have grappled with the test).
152. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV. L. REV. 54, 81 (1997) (concluding that the possibility of broad ranges of
reasonable disagreement regarding the application of constitutional multi-factor
balancing tests creates uncertainty and heightens the "burdens of litigation");
Rogers, supra note 112, at 1272 (discussing how the use of ill-guided and multifarious
tests within the arm-of-the-state doctrine has created unpredictability for litigants and
lower courts).
153. See Royal Indem. Co. v. Tyco Fire Prods. LP, 704 S.E.2d 704 S.E.2d 91, 99 (Va.
2011) (Mims, J., concurring) (noting that the court has ruled on the definition of
"ordinary building materials" seven times in twenty five years, and predicting that,
since the analysis is still unclear, there will likely be more cases to come).
154. See Francis E. McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionality of Product
Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 583 (1981) (reporting that statutes of
repose "promote a policy of finality in legal relationships"); supra notes 21-23 and
accompanying text (describing the operation of statutes of repose).
155. See Royal Indem. Co., 704 S.E.2d at 99 (Mims, J., concurring) (criticizing the
"ordinary building materials" jurisprudence); Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 201 (Mims, J.,
concurring) (same).
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ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES

A. Justice Mims' Supplemented Common-Sense Approach: Less Cumbersome
But Still Unworkable
Through his 2010 and 2011 concurrences in Jamerson and Royal
Indemnity Co., Justice Mims of the Supreme Court of Virginia
established and reaffirmed his opposition to the current "ordinary
building materials" jurisprudence and proposed a supplemented
"common-sense" approach.'5 6
On the merits, Justice Mims'
His suggested
alternative proposal offers several benefits.
interpretation of the test is simple, readily applied, and eradicates the
complex formulation developed over the course of a quarter of a
century's worth of jurisprudence.15 7 More simplistic judicial tests
generally produce fewer appeals and reversals and foster greater
judicial predictability.'
This simplicity benefits plaintiffs deciding
whether to file suit as well as corporations deciding whether to enter
the market to make improvements to real property.1 59 Moreover,
Justice Mims' suggestion avoids the "gamesmanship" that more
complex judicial tests often encourage and, instead, increases the
probability that settlements will actually express a claim's legal and
factual merits. 60
Justice Mims' approach does, however, face a number of issues.
First, his suggested definitions of "equipment" and "machinery" both
utilize the very terms they purport to define.' 6 ' Circular definitions
156. See supra Part I.E (recounting Mims' criticism of the current test's overcomplexity and lack of guidance and detailing his suggested solution stemming from
a plain reading of the statute of repose).
157. Compare Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 205-06 (Mims, J., concurring) (outlining a
supplemented common-sense approach to the "ordinary building materials" test),
with supra Part I.D (recounting the factors and nuances of the current six-factor
judicial test for "ordinary building materials"). See generally HENRY WEIHOFEN, LEGAL
WRITING STYLE 3-4 (2d ed. 1980) (adopting preciseness, conciseness, simplicity, and
clear expression as the four fundamentals of legal and judicial writing and
scholarship).
158. See, e.g.,
Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010) (asserting that, in the
context of jurisdictional statutes, complex judicial tests produce appeals and
reversals, while simple rules promote predictability).
159. Id.; see also Sandra Berns, JudicialDecision Making and Moral Responsibility, 13
ADEL. L. REv. 119, 123 (1991) (arguing that if judicial decision making is arbitrary,
then laws are unable to supply the certainty necessary for individuals to plan their
behavior rationally and further their own interests).
160. See Hertz Corp., 559 U.S. at 94 ("Complex tests produce appeals and reversals,
encourage gamesmanship, and, again, diminish the likelihood that results and
settlements will reflect a claim's legal and factual merits.").
161. SeeJamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 205 (Mims, J., concurring) (suggesting reference
to the Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code, which defines "equipment" as
"plumbing, heating, electrical, ventilating, air-conditioning and refrigeration
equipment, elevators, dumbwaiters, escalators and other mechanical additions or
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often produce fallacies and ambiguities.'6 2 They provide no actual
value, "63
' as individuals unfamiliar with the term at issue gain no
helpful insight." Thus, insofar as Mims' definitions incorporate the
terms they claim to define, they provide little to no clarification and
leave litigants and the judiciary equally uninformed.
Second, Mims' proposed solution does not account for the effect of
technological advancements on modern notions of structural
Although Mims argues first for a common-sense
essentials.
understanding of equipment and machinery as used in the statute, 6 5
he notes that in difficult or ambiguous cases, courts should turn to
the Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code, which defines
"equipment" as "plumbing, heating, electrical, ventilating, airconditioning and refrigeration equipment, elevators, dumbwaiters,
'
Mims
escalators and other mechanical additions or installations."166
goes on to note that the term "machinery" includes things such as
"manufacturing
machinery,
printing
presses,
[and]
large
67
computers."1
As discussed at length above, technological advancements and
their integration into common use change the way individuals think
about what is "ordinary."'" Alterations in the "ordinary" foster the
As individuals become
evolution of standard amenities. 169
installations" (emphasis added) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 36-97 (2009))); see also id.
(insisting that "[machinery clearly includes.., manufacturing machinery, printing
presses, [and] large computers" (emphasis added) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 36-97)).
162. See ROBERTJ. GuLA, NONSENSE: RED HERRINGS, STRAW MEN AND SACRED COWS:
How WE ABUSE LOGIC IN OUR EVERYDAY LANGUAGE 145 (2007) (noting that because
the circular definition is untenably narrow, and thus uninformative, it is often called
the "question-begging definition"); Steven S. Nemerson, Alcoholism, Intoxication, and
the Criminal Law, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 393, 427 (1988) (remarking that the problems
inherent in circular definitions are "readily apparent").
163. LYNN SILIPIGNI CONNAWAY & RONALD R. POWELL, BASIC RESEARCH METHODS FOR
LIBRARIANS 57 (5th ed. 2010) (cautioning against the use of circular or "spurious"
definitions, such as defining "library use" as "using the library" because they provide
no real value or additional clarity to the reader).
AN
164. See WILLIAM HUGHES & JONATHAN [AVERY, CRITICAL THINKING:
INTRODUCTION TO THE BASIC SKILLS 48 (5th ed. 2008) (providing, as an example, that

a definition of "golf ball" that references the "game of golf' would be of little use to
anyone unfamiliar with the game); see also David B. Cruz, "JustDon't CallIt Marriage":
The First Amendment and Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CALIF. L. REv. 925,
1002 (2001) ("The circular definitional argument is little more than legal ipse
dixit."); Mike Roberts, The Constitutionality of Gaming in Tennessee, 61 TENN. L. REV.
675, 690 (1994) (disparaging circular definitions as "tautological conundrum [s] ").
165. Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 205 (Mims, J., concurring) (advocating a "return to
first principles... [and] the plain language of the statute").
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-97; seeJamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 205 (Mims, J., concurring).
167. Jamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 205 (MimsJ., concurring).
168. See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
169. See, e.g., A World Secured, supra note 128 and accompanying text (articulating
the zipper's famed transformation into a standard and ubiquitous amenity).
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accustomed to these amenities or features, the common notion of
what is essential advances as well. 17 By associating "common sense"
with enumerated lists of items taken to encompass proverbial
examples of equipment and machinery, Justice Mims suggests the use
of a reference list that is sure to be outpaced by society's advancing
common-sense understanding of equipment and machinery.'
Lastly, in dictating what is or is not an "ordinary building material"
for purposes of the statute, Mims' suggested test gives no
consideration to the underlying nature or purpose of the structure.'
The nature and purpose of a structure, however, will necessarily
dictate the requisite features, qualities, and materials of that
structure. 17 For example, a wharf or pier will require different
component items than a water treatment plant, a manufacturing
facility, a single-family dwelling, a high-rise office building, or a
simple storage warehouse. 174 Each of these structures will require a
distinct set of components so that the builder may successfully
construct it to fulfill the purpose for which it was erected. 175 What is
considered to be "ordinary building materials" for one structure may
not be ordinary for another. 76 As a result, a certain amount of
relativity is required in practice, but such a consideration is omitted
170. See generally Sharon Johnston & Mark A. Peacock, Developing Professionalism
Across the Generations, in TEACHING MEDICAL PROFESSIONALISM 150, 154-55 (Richard L.
Cruess et al. eds., 2009) ("[Ljifestyle expectations change as slowly or quickly as the
surrounding social and cultural milieu change.").
171. See generally Alpern, supra note 143, at 2003-04 (asserting that utilizing a
definitional approach to determine what constitutes an "improvement" to real
property is unlikely to respond to society's interests over time).
172. SeeJamerson, 699 S.E.2d at 201-06 (Mims, J., concurring) (recommending a
common-sense, plain-language approach but failing to account for the varying
construction needs of differing structures).
173. See EDWARD ALLEN &JOSEPH IANO, FUNDAMENTALS OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION:
MATERIALS & METHODS 4 (4th ed. 2004) (articulating that decisions regarding
materials and structural features are constrained by economic and legal restrictions
as well as physical realities and the desired practical arrangement of the structure);
Phoebe Crisman, Materials, WHOLE BUILDING DESIGN GUIDE (June 16, 2010),
http://www.wbdg.org/resources/materials.php (stating that material choices are
regulated by the building type and size).
174.

Compare, e.g., Ed Acker, Warehouse, WHOLE BUILDING DESIGN GUIDE (Oct. 12,

2011)
http://www.wbdg.org/design/warehouse.php
(providing design and
construction guidance for warehouses, which must incorporate components to
accommodate loads of materials, handling of equipment, and needs of operating
personnel), with Brian Conway, Office Building, WHOLE BUILDING DESIGN GUIDE (July

22, 2010) http://www.wbdg.org/design/office.php
(providing design and
construction guidance for office buildings to achieve objectives such as safety,
comfort, and aesthetics).
175. See, e.g., supra note 174 (describing the usual necessities and components of
office buildings and warehouse facilities).
176. See
generally Building Types, WHOLE
BUILDING
DESIGN
GUIDE,
http://www.wbdg.org/design/buildingtypes.thp (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) ("A
building's function strongly influences its design and construction.').
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In failing to account for

the varying underlying nature of structures, Justice Mims' suggestion
to return to a supplemented common-sense and plain meaning test
represents an overly simplistic view."'
B.

Slaying the JurisprudentialBeast: The "Classified Common-Sense
Approach"
To avoid the various pitfalls of the current approach 7 9 and the
issues generated by Justice Mims' suggested approach, 8 ° both the
legislature and the judiciary will likely need to contribute to reform.
The classified common-sense approach offers one such framework.
Under this model, the Virginia General Assembly should consider
drafting a guiding document or issuing a supplementary amended
provision to section 8.01-250, whereby improvements to real property
are broken into groups of structures sharing similar characteristics,
i.e., manufacturing structures, warehouse facilities, high-rise
domiciles, etc."'
With the addition of a structured classification scheme, the
judiciary should then follow Justice Mims' common-sense
approach. 8 2 Thus, in characterizing products as either "equipment,"
"machinery," or "ordinary building materials," courts will be able to
eliminate the complex factor-based approach and rely on more
intuitive notions of "ordinary building materials" for each general
177. See Alpern, supra note 143, at 2003 (asserting that law should be responsive to
the changing society it is designed to serve (quoting John Wagner Assocs. v.
Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1129 (Utah Ct. App. 1990))).
178. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and
Cures, 42 DuKE L.J. 1, 44 (1992) (depicting a delicate balance between complexity
and simplicity).
179. See supra Part II.A-C (outlining the cumbersome nature of the current
approach as well as its inconsistent results).
180. See supra Part III.A (condemning Mims' approach for utilizing circular
definitions, failing to account for advancements in technology and notions of
"ordinary," and failing to account for the underlying nature or purpose of
structures).
181. See, e.g., INT'L BLDG. CODE §§ 303-312 (Int'l Code Council 2009) (creating a
system of classification within the model building code such that different classes of
structures are held to varying levels of safety depending on the nature of their
construction and use). See generally WILLIAm F. FRANKENA, Some Beliefs about Justice, in
PERSPECTIVES ON MORALITY: ESSAYS OF WILLIAM K. FRANKENA 93, 94 (K. E. Goodpaster
ed. 1976) ("[T]here is one principle of... justice on which there seems to be
general agreement, namely, that like cases or individuals are to dealt with in the
same way or treated alike, or that similar cases are to be treated similarly.").
182. Cf Alpern, supra note 143, at 2003-04 (recognizing that unlike pure
definitional approaches, which may fail to address situations not contemplated at the
time of drafting, common-sense approaches grant courts the flexibility to deliver
justice in a manner that is consistent with both unforeseen fact patterns and
changing "attitudes towards structures").
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type of structure. 8 3 Approaching the question of "ordinary building
materials" from a common-sense position will grant the necessary
level of fluidity and relativity needed to ensure that the results are
commensurate with advancing levels of technology and notions of
what is structurally essential.1 4 It will also eliminate large levels of
uncertainty and unpredictability for litigants.'8 5
Eliminating
substantial uncertainty from "ordinary building materials"
jurisprudence will ensure that the test generates
results that comply
86
with the underlying policy of statutes of repose.1
Just as any other methodology, this proposed "classified commonsense" approach possesses both benefits and drawbacks. In terms of
benefits, it retains all of the traditional advantages of common-sense
approaches.'8 7 Moreover, unlike the current judicial test and Justice
Mims' version of the common-sense approach,' 8 a classified
common-sense approach allows for unqualified evolution of what
constitutes an "ordinary building material."8 9 Because the proposed
test does not reference determinate definitions, which may become
antiquated or irrelevant over time, it retains the flexibility to
accommodate advancing technologies and changing societal
attitudes. 9 ' Furthermore, the test respects the varied purposes of
different structures. By establishing classes of improvements or
183. See generally RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 77 (1990)
("Our most confident knowledge, therefore, is intuitive, because intuitions lie at the
base of all our proofs and reasoning and because it is always possible to make a
mistake in the process of proof itself ....
").
184. See Alpern, supra note 143, at 2003-04 (advancing a common-sense approach
to the idea of "improvements to real property" because it is flexible enough to keep
pace with changing technologies and attitudes towards structures).
185. See generally CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN
INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY 91 (1983) (maintaining that any individual "with
faculties reasonably intact can grasp common-sense conclusions," as the endeavor
allows for "no acknowledged specialists," but is rather "open to all"); Terry A.
Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as ConstitutionalLaw, 62 VAND. L. REV. 851, 861
(2009) (reflecting on arguments rooted in common sense as accessible and
egalitarian).
186. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (discussing the underlying policy
justifications for statutes of repose, which center on eliminating high levels of
uncertainty associated with the threat of unlimited potential liability).
187. See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text (specifying that the simplicity
of common-sense approaches provides greater predictability, avoids gamesmanship,
and increases the likelihood that settlements will reflect a claim's legal and factual
merits).
188. See supra notes 124-137, 168-171 and accompanying text (outlining the
inability of the current test and the supplemented common-sense test to account for
the evolvement of the concept of ordinary).
189. See Alpern, supra note 143, at 2003-04 (delineating the distinctive ability of
pure common-sense approaches to account for changing technologies and societal
attitudes).
190. See id.
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structures, the test permits the purpose and logistical necessities of
each structure to independently define what is "ordinary" for that
particular genre without altering the standards of others.1 9'
On the other hand, the proposed test faces a few potential
Drafting the guiding document or generating the
drawbacks.
classification scheme for real property would be work-intensive for
the legislature, and reaching an agreement regarding the specifics of
92
This
such a scheme could take significant time and energy."
downside, a potential drain on the resources and patience of elected
officials, does not weigh heavily on the substantive merits of the
The fact that a proposed suggestion or
suggested approach.
alternative is more burdensome to effectuate is not itself a reason to
dismiss the suggestion.

93

Potentially more problematic, the "classified common-sense
approach" could present practical difficulties as individuals attempt
to sort real property into the established categories. Properties that
serve dual purposes or that have been repurposed may defy clear-cut94
classification and could therefore be challenging to categorize.
Depending on the number of improvements presenting this
challenge, classifying such improvements could add a varying level of
complexity to the proposed test.' 95 However, in these scenarios, the
appearance of complexity may be more pronounced than the
reality.' 96 In either case, where buildings or structures serve multiple
purposes or have been repurposed, there will be a broader range of

191. See, e.g., ALLEN & IONO, supra note 173, at 4-5 (explaining that one of the
benefits of the International Building Code's use of "occupancy groups" is that it
allows for differing standards in ordinary safety features across the various groups).
192. See Fallon, supra note 152, at 82 ("[R]ules, which aspire to determine
multiple outcomes in advance, are typically harder to formulate than standards or
balancing tests."). See generally Patricia E. Salkin, The Politics of Land Use Reform in New
York:
Challenges and Opportunities, 73 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1041, 1063 (1999)
(confirming that the amount of time necessary to enact reform may strain
resources).
193. See Linn Farms & Timber Ltd. v. Union Pac. R.R., 661 F.3d 354, 361-62 (8th
Cir. 2011) (arguing that the Supreme Court in Jones v. Flowers, 547 U.S. 220 (2006),
did not reject an alternative merely because it was more burdensome).
194. See, e.g., Rich Walker, A Repurposing Design Approach: Adaptive Reuse for Green,
Budget-ConsciousBuilding,ARCHIrEcr's GUIDE TO GLASS & METAL, Mar.-Apr. 2011, at 6,
6-7 (discussing the process of converting and adapting existing buildings for new
purposes).
195. See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values
and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 673 (2004) (contending that "greater
complexity is associated with a greater number of relevant elements worthy of
consideration").
196. See infra note 197 and accompanying text (maintaining that complexity need
not result because the class of "ordinary building materials" will simply flex to
accommodate the dual natures of the building).
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items that could be included in the class of "ordinary building
materials."'9 7
Converted lofts provide a useful example of how a classified
common-sense approach might work in practice. In a converted
factory loft, residual piping or ductwork may be exposed in the
residential space.'98 While these items might be outside the realm of
"ordinary building materials" for a newly-built structure,'9 9 in the case
of a converted or repurposed structure such as a loft, the class of
"ordinary building materials" would merely be expanded to include
historical features of the structure, such as residual piping or
ductwork.2"' Thus, although the classified common-sense approach
may allow for some uncertainty for litigants whose particular
improvements to real property elude a clear-cut categorization, it
promotes more certainty than the current judicial test and is
therefore more consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute
of repose.2"'
Overall, although the suggestion found within a "classified
common-sense approach" may not eradicate every issue currently
associated with the "ordinary building materials" test, it is a starting
point for reform that avoids much of the current test's burdensome
As
application,' °2 unpredictability, and inconsistent results. 20 3
197. Cf INT'L BLDG. CODE § 302.1 (Int'l Code Council 2009) (establishing a
categorization structure for buildings based on their occupancy purposes and
announcing that where buildings possess characteristics of multiple occupancy
groups, the structures must comply with all of the requirements applicable to each
group).
LOFTS,
FACTORY
WINSTON
e.g.,
198. See,
http://www.winstonfactorylofts.com/features (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) (advertising
a luxury apartment complex converted from an industrial building that retained
exposed ductwork).
199. See, e.g., CAPITOL YARDS, http://www.capitolyardsdc.com/features (last visited
Aug. 10, 2013) (advertising a newly-constructed luxury apartment complex that lacks
exposed duct work and other features common in converted residential buildings);
WELLINGTON APARTMENTS, http://livethewellington.com/features (last visited Aug. 8,
2013) (same); PEARL APARTMENTS, http://www.1401walnut.com/luxury-apartmentamenities.cfm (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) (same).
200. See supra note 197 and accompanying text (providing that within the
classified common-sense approach, the class of "ordinary building materials" flexes
to accommodate any residual markers of a structure's previous use).
201. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (examining the underlying policy
justifications for statutes of repose, which center on eliminating for individuals the
high levels of uncertainty associated with the threat of unlimited potential liability).
202. Compare Part II.A (outlining the unwieldy nature of the current test and
multi-factor tests generally), with Part III.B (discussing the classified common-sense
approach, in which common sense drives the outcomes within the framework of
predefined classes of structures).
203. Compare supra note 112 and accompanying text (insisting that multi-factor
tests that lack accompanying guidance often result in unilateral ad hoc decisions),
with supra note 185 and accompanying text (asserting that common-sense
approaches grant certainty and predictability to litigants, as common sense is
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litigants, practitioners, and judges continue to work to improve
Virginia Code section 8.01-250 and consider both problems and
alternative options, however, the jurisprudential test for "ordinary
building materials" will likely continue to adapt until it produces
consistent results and harmonizes with both advancing technologies
and the statute's underlying purpose.2 °4
CONCLUSION

The court-constructed idea of "ordinary building materials" has
become a problematic term of art. Over the decades, as the Virginia
courts have endeavored to distinguish "ordinary building materials"
from "equipment" and "machinery," the judicial analysis has become
Although the courts have ostensibly
increasingly burdensome.
altered and amended the test in an effort to unify the results, the
current six-factor test remains overly complex and cumbersome, and
produces inconsistent and counterintuitive results. Moreover, it is
unclear if the current framework of the test is comprehensive-are
the six factors exclusive, or are they merely illustrative?
These defects and uncertainties should compel both the legislature
and judiciary to reconsider their respective contributions to the
current statute of repose found in Virginia Code section 8.01-250.
The legislature and judiciary should strive for an effective and
principled test that delivers more than a cursory level of guidance
and avoids the current complex matrix of variables. The current
test's inconsistent results and negative consequences demonstrate
that selectively employing factors and hoping that the proverbial
needle on the scale points decisively towards either "equipment,"
"machinery," or "ordinary building materials," is untenable.
The legislature and judiciary should work together to simplify the
existing analytical marathon currently required to classify products.
To solve the problems associated with the current test, the legislature
accessible to all reasonable actors). Cf Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94-95
(2010) (justifying the Court's use of the simpler "nerve center" test over a more

complex "general business activities" test when determining a corporation's principal
place of business for jurisdictional purposes because the nerve center test provides
administrative simplicity, and legislative history suggests that a simpler test is
preferred).

204. See Mark R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in ChangingState Law:
The Employment at Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 227, 238 (1984)
(pronouncing that "common law rules adapt over time"); see also BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCEss 23 (1921) ("The rules and principles
of case law have never been treated as final truths, but as working hypotheses,
continually restated in those great laboratories of the law, the courts of justice. Every
new case is an experiment; and if the accepted rule which seems applicable yields a
result which is felt to be unjust, the rule is reconsidered.").
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should pass an amendment or guiding document that classifies real
property into basic groups. Within these categories, courts would
then apply common-sense notions of "ordinary building materials,"
"machinery," and "equipment" such that classifications would reflect
the underlying nature of the structure and technological
advancements. This clear and simple approach would not only allow
for easier application, more consistent results, and lower litigation
rates, but would also honor the underlying spirit of predictable, timelimited liability in which the General Assembly passed Virginia Code
section 8.01-250.

